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<oembed><version>1.0</version><provider_name>&#x645;&#x639;&#x647;&#x62F; &#x627;&#x633;&#x62A;&#x642;&#x631;&#x627;&#x631; &#x627;&#x644;&#x634;&#x631;&#x642; &#x627;&#x644;&#x623;&#x648;&#x633;&#x637; &#x648;&#x634;&#x645;&#x627;&#x644; &#x623;&#x641;&#x631;&#x64A;&#x642;&#x64A;&#x627;</provider_name><provider_url>https://menastability.org/ar</provider_url><author_name>The Institute For MENA Stability</author_name><author_url>https://menastability.org/ar/author/oar93/</author_url><title>Energising Syria's future - The Institute For MENA Stability</title><type>rich</type><width>600</width><height>338</height><html>&lt;blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="JKFllb77H2"&gt;&lt;a href="https://menastability.org/ar/institute-for-mena-stability/energising-syrias-future/"&gt;&#x62A;&#x646;&#x634;&#x64A;&#x637; &#x645;&#x633;&#x62A;&#x642;&#x628;&#x644; &#x633;&#x648;&#x631;&#x64A;&#x627;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;iframe sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted" src="https://menastability.org/ar/institute-for-mena-stability/energising-syrias-future/embed/#?secret=JKFllb77H2" width="600" height="338" title="&#x201C;Energising Syria&#x2019;s future&#x201D; &#x2014; The Institute For MENA Stability" data-secret="JKFllb77H2" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no" class="wp-embedded-content"&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;&lt;script&gt;
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&lt;/script&gt;</html><thumbnail_url>https://menastability.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/image-17.png</thumbnail_url><thumbnail_width>1920</thumbnail_width><thumbnail_height>640</thumbnail_height><description>Data: European Commission, GISCO, 2025; GEM, 2024; PRIO, PETRODATA, 2009 Geopolitics of energy in Syria T&#xFC;rkiye fostered regional power hub ambitions even before the fall of the Assad regime. Its current pipelines provide oil and gas from&#xA0;Russia and Azerbaijan to the EU. Ankara aims to challenge the Eastern Mediterranean gas forum by positioning itself as the key conduit for gas flowing from Egypt, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and possibly&#xA0;Syria&#xA0;and&#xA0;Iraq&#xA0;into Europe. It also has ambitions to expand its own oil and gas production in the Black Sea and in contested waters off Syria&#x2019;s coast around Cyprus. It has already sought to accelerate negotiations&#xA0;demarcating sea borders&#xA0;with the new Syrian government.&#xA0; T&#xFC;rkiye has supported the&#xA0;regional electricity grid of Idlib&#xA0;since 2021 in parallel with its backing of the Idlib-based rebels who now control Syria. The provision of a reliable supply of Turkish electricity has helped bolster the legitimacy of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in the breakaway region. A similar formula of Turkish-provided energy security hopes to replicate this success at the national level. T&#xFC;rkiye fostered regional power hub ambitions even before the fall of the Assad regime.&#xA0; Qatar too is aligned with T&#xFC;rkiye in supporting the new regime. Its longstanding support for the Idlib rebels gives it a vested interest in ensuring their survival in Damascus. Alongside geopolitical gain, it is also well-placed to profit from helping develop Syria&#x2019;s oil and fossil gas reserves. Cognisant that energy is a key vulnerability for the new government, Saudi Arabia has cautiously provided support, although this has been limited to short-term fuel supplies. More concerning for the EU, Russia and Iran appear ready to exploit energy vulnerabilities to leverage some of their former relationships in Syria. Iran has signalled&#xA0;that it is willing to drop demands for the $30-50 billion&#xA0;owed to it by the previous regime for oil imports, seemingly as part of&#xA0;negotiations on restoring diplomatic relations.&#xA0; The EU and Syrian energy security&#xA0; The EU should not be a passive actor in the energy politics playing out in Syria and the broader Eastern Mediterranean. On Syria it should put forward two clear proposals: one to complement initiatives by T&#xFC;rkiye and Qatar, and another to freeze out those of Russia and Iran.&#xA0; The first is short to medium-term support for Syria&#x2019;s energy sector, which urgently needs investment. Prior to the war, European-based oil companies,&#xA0;Total and Shell, had considerable interests in Syria which could be restored. Syria&#x2019;s proximity to the EU makes it a strong candidate for near-shoring and diversifying energy supplies. The EU should therefore take a more assertive role in supporting Syria&#x2019;s renewable energy sector, especially solar, which has undergone considerable expansion despite the war. The country has significant potential for renewable energy, lying within the&#xA0;solar belt with high levels of solar radiation&#xA0;and featuring several areas where &#xA0;wind speeds exceed 6 m/s, making wind power a viable option. The&#xA0;civil war demonstrated to the Syrian people that&#xA0;energy independence with local control over energy supplies&#xA0;is one of the few ways to guarantee energy security. The EU should build on this strong foundation to help with the country&#x2019;s recovery while advancing its own strategic interests. The EU should not be a passive actor in the energy politics playing out in Syria and the broader Eastern Mediterranean. The second proposal envisions a longer-term energy system integration plan for Syria, independent of initiatives led by T&#xFC;rkiye, Qatar and other actors. The EU could facilitate Syria&#x2019;s integration into the European energy market by establishing interconnections via Cyprus and Greece for both electricity and gas. This would link Syria to an alternative gas grid while also granting access to a large import and export market for electricity. While this requires time and considerable investment, it would connect to a broader strategy integrating the EU into the Eastern Mediterranean.&#xA0; By offering robust economic support and promoting regional energy security, the EU can play a meaningful role in shaping Syria&#x2019;s future. Taken from the European Union Institute for Security Studies, written by Caspar Hobhouse</description></oembed>
