{"id":1,"date":"2026-02-02T19:19:45","date_gmt":"2026-02-02T19:19:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/?p=1"},"modified":"2026-02-03T12:29:16","modified_gmt":"2026-02-03T12:29:16","slug":"integration-or-conflict-in-northeastern-syria-ten-key-points-to-consider","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/en\/middle-east\/integration-or-conflict-in-northeastern-syria-ten-key-points-to-consider\/","title":{"rendered":"Integration or conflict in northeastern Syria? Ten key points to consider"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

After 10 months of US-mediated talks failed to achieve an integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into Syria\u2019s transitional state, hostilities erupted in early January \u2014 first in Kurdish districts of Aleppo City<\/a> from January 6 to 10 and then spreading east across the Euphrates River on January 17. In the space of 24 hours over January 17-18, the SDF lost approximately 80% of its territory, as the 65-70% of its fighting force composed of Arab fighters defected and turned to the government in Damascus. This was a catastrophic development for Washington\u2019s long-time partner in the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS), but it was also one that could have been avoided had integration talks been proactively implemented.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

How we got here<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

When Bashar al-Assad\u2019s regime collapsed just over a year ago, Syria fell into the control of armed opposition groups that had fought the regime for more than a decade. But the interim government that swiftly took shape in the capital, Damascus, never attained control of all of the country. In northeastern Syria stood the Kurdish-led SDF, which in addition to being the international community\u2019s primary partner in combating ISIS since 2015 had also been at loggerheads and often hostilities with Syria\u2019s armed opposition. Over nearly a decade, the SDF not only partnered with the United States in defeating ISIS\u2019s territorial \u201cstate,\u201d but it also established its own political and governance project, known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While it swiftly became clear that integrating the SDF into the state needed to happen, the question of how to convince two long-time adversaries to unite presented a significant quandary. On March 10, 2025, the US successfully corralled both parties to sign a framework agreement in which they agreed to the principle of integration and a path of negotiations aimed at determining what that would look like. As mediator, Washington set an initial deadline of August 2025 for the deal\u2019s implementation, which then stretched to October, and finally to December 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Syrian government launched its current offensive after lengthy though constructive talks with the SDF, carried on throughout 2025, fell apart. These negotiations were regularly interrupted by the SDF needing to engage in internal consultations; and Damascus felt that its counterparts in the discussions were undertaking little to no implementation of the agreed-to terms. For its part, the SDF continued to insist that more time was needed to flesh out details. However, the government believed that SDF leader Mazloum Abdi was stalling and could not convince more radical Kurdish elements to accept the compromises he had struck \u2014 or that his group was simply unwilling to give up the virtual independence it had enjoyed since the outbreak of the civil war in 2012.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As hostilities escalated on January 17, US diplomacy stepped in, with senior diplomats and military officers deploying to active front lines, negotiating tables, and regional capitals in a bid to calm tensions and force through the integration of the SDF\u2019s Kurdish core into the Syrian state. The straw that broke the camel\u2019s back for Damascus came right after the SDF lost control of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa governorates to Arab tribal uprisings on January 17-18. The next day, Mazloum Abdi arrived in the Syrian capital to request that the SDF be permitted to integrate into the state but re-assume authority over all three provinces previously under its control: the two aforementioned governorates as well as Hasakeh. That triggered dismay in the room, with US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack even leaving<\/a> prematurely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As things stand today, the Syrian government has no desire to militarily confront Kurdish-majority areas. Its military objectives remain driven by what Damascus describes as its \u201csovereign\u201d right and duty to control borders, trade and revenue streams, national assets and infrastructure, and judicial facilities (including prisons and al-Hol and al-Roj camps), as well as to assert a monopoly over the use of force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"L24
Used with permission from L24.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

What to know about how things may unfold<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recent developments have been extremely complex and fast moving, and the information space is clouded by large amounts of conflicting claims and disinformation. Here are 10 key takeaways and indications of where things could go next, based on this author\u2019s extensive conversations with mediators, actors on the ground, senior officials in Damascus, as well as readouts from January 27-28 talks in the Syrian capital:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1. The cease-fire has held, but largely in name only.<\/strong> Since a US-mediated four-day cease-fire was announced on January 20 and a 15-day extension declared on January 24, significant hostilities have continued between Syrian government and SDF forces. This ongoing conflict has primarily centered on two fronts: 1) in the countryside southwest of Kobani, where government forces have sought to take control of a string of more than 12 Arab villages besieged by SDF forces; and 2) in the countryside southeast of Qamishli, where government forces have sought to cut off the SDF\u2019s access to the Semalka border crossing with Iraq\u2019s Kurdish region and stop the convoys of Kurdish volunteers (allegedly<\/a> including numerous Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party, or PKK, fighters) who have crossed<\/a> there into Syria to join the SDF every day over the past week.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Persistent probing by government forces and SDF shelling of government frontline positions and Arab villages near them risks triggering additional, dangerous escalation. More than 40 SDF suicide drone<\/a> strikes<\/a> were reported on government military and civilian targets between January 24 and 26 alone. Nevertheless, Syrian government forces have refrained from entering Kurdish-majority areas to try to avoid inflaming tensions and unleashing a spiral of deadly violence. As a result, the conflict has remained one between military actors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For now, the city of Hasakeh (home to an approximately 30% Kurdish community) remains in the hands of the SDF \u2014 but its status as an Arab-majority provincial capital and the last remaining significant Arab area not under government control has made it a contentious issue. Should Arab villages remain besieged by SDF forces and the status of Hasakeh remain unresolved, tribal fighters may escalate and take matters in their own hands by advancing into Kurdish areas themselves \u2014 despite intensive efforts by President Ahmed al-Sharaa and his tribal envoy Abu Ahmed Zakour to restrain them. Meanwhile, at least<\/a> 60<\/a> trucks<\/a> of humanitarian aid entered Kurdish areas between January 25 and 27, facilitated by Damascus, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, and the United Nations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A new round of direct talks in Damascus on January 27 saw both sides reassert their agreement to a cease-fire, and fighting did ease into the night.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. The SDF now has 48 hours to begin the integration process.<\/strong> According to the January 18 agreement and follow-up talks<\/a> in Damascus on January 27, the SDF is expected, by January 29, to have facilitated<\/a> the entry of government Ministry of Interior personnel into Hasakeh and Qamishli cities and other Kurdish areas not only to take charge of security but also to expel all non-Syrian PKK operatives from Syrian territory. Meanwhile, the SDF is expected to begin the process of individually integrating its fighters into the Ministry of Defense and to control the integration of its internal security forces (Asayish) into local police units under the command of the interior ministry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beyond security matters, a senior Syrian government source and a US official involved in mediation confirmed to this author that the SDF is expected to turn over control of border crossings, oil and natural gas facilities, as well as prisons and camps to government authority. The SDF\u2019s civil administration, the AANES, meanwhile, is expected to begin integrating itself into state structures, with government ministries taking formal charge of all local administration. As part of the January 18 agreement, the SDF has additionally submitted candidates for deputy minister of defense, governor of Hasakeh, and several other senior ministry posts, awaiting Damascus\u2019 approval.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These reported agreements, if implemented, would amount to a significant defeat for the SDF and its years-old political project in Syria. However, they come within an environment in which US and other external mediators have concluded that diplomacy has few if any more chances to avoid the situation on the ground devolving into full-scale war and, in all likelihood, a long-term Kurdish insurgency against Syria\u2019s already fragile transitional government. The SDF, and specifically its leader Mazloum Abdi, has therefore been under huge pressure from Washington to ensure that a negotiated integration is achieved, no matter how challenging that prospect may be internally within the wider SDF movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even if<\/em> these steps are initiated in the coming hours and days \u2014 as defined by the 48-hour timeline set out on January 27 \u2014 the process is unlikely to be smooth, or entirely peaceful. But time is of the essence. Patience in Damascus is extremely limited, following nearly a year of talks with no implementation on the ground. Significant animosity and a decade of bad blood also stands between these rival actors. To make matters more complicated, substantial<\/a> numbers<\/a> of former officers<\/a> and militiamen linked to the previous regime of Bashar al-Assad are known to have joined the SDF and Asayish over the past year, with Damascus asserting that there will be no integration process offered to them. The entry of interior ministry personnel to Hasakeh and Qamishli, as agreed on January 27, would help to minimize the many risks of insecurity resulting from a complex process of integration on the ground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. SDF leader Mazloum Abdi does not appear to be in full control of his own movement<\/strong>. This will pose a major challenge to implementing the January 27 agreement, just as it prevented the implementation of comprehensive US-mediated agreements in October 2025 and on January 17, 2026. Syria\u2019s transitional President Sharaa has consolidated a strong grip over the machinery of the state. Whereas, as repeatedly revealed in conversations with this author, American, French, Jordanian, and Iraqi Kurdish mediators are acutely aware Abdi lacks the ability to make prompt commitments without taking leave for prolonged periods of \u201cinternal consultation\u201d that typically result in inaction, or the emergence of new unworkable conditions. According to two US government sources, over the past months, PKK figures both inside and outside Syrian territory are known to have exerted significant pressure on Mazloum to avoid committing to integration, for fear of losing their last territorial asset amid an ongoing peace process with Turkey. The prospect of signing and committing to implementing a deal that amounts to the collective surrender of the PKK\u2019s project in Syria would appear to present a risk to Mazloum himself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The repetitive process of constructive talks, then SDF internal consultation, followed by zero implementation directly contributed to the government\u2019s resorting to hostilities in January 2026. The fact that Mazloum Abdi, who in ordinary circumstances is a remarkably calm and pragmatic operator, arrived in Damascus on January 19 and effectively asked for the government to return the expansive tract of territory he had just lost back to the control of fighters loyal to him raised disconcerting questions about the pressures he appeared to be under from elements around him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to one high-level regional security official, several senior SDF figures with deep roots within the PKK \u2014 but not<\/em> Abdi \u2014 have consulted at length in recent days with Hikmat al-Hijri, a Druze figure in Suwayda who has aligned himself and his \u201cNational Guard\u201d militia force closely with Israel while calling publicly for secession from Syria. Such signals intelligence intercepts have caused concern that elements within the SDF\u2019s leadership remain committed to blocking any integration and sustaining a posture of hostility and stand-off with the Syrian government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

4. There have been crimes committed by both sides, but \u2026 <\/strong>unlike periods of intense fighting in Syria\u2019s Alawite-majority coastal region in March and in the Druze-majority governorate of Suwayda in July 2025, there has not been any mass campaign of civilian killing in northeastern Syria. The decision by Syria\u2019s defense ministry to focus exclusively on advancing into Arab areas and avoiding Kurdish regions altogether has unquestionably helped, as government forces have been welcomed by celebrations in each locality they have entered. There are also signs that the defense ministry\u2019s internal cohesion, command and control, and operational discipline have improved markedly compared to last year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Isolated incidents of criminal acts by government forces have been confirmed \u2014 including several incidents of desecrating SDF corpses (male and female), vandalism of an SDF graveyard, and use of unguided munitions into civilian areas. Kurdish militiamen, meanwhile, stand accused of causing nearly 20 civilian deaths<\/a> by sniper fire and carrying out several video-recorded extrajudicial executions<\/a>, including of 21 men<\/a> south of Kobani late on January 21. Thankfully, the frequency of such crimes has declined significantly since January 25, but their early incidence contributed to an acute level of animosity between the government and Arab communities on the one side, and the SDF on the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now that government frontlines have effectively reached and stopped outside of Kurdish-majority areas, the prospect of a resumption of full-scale hostilities raises the risk of crimes and atrocities significantly. This is why the January 18 and January 27 agreements must now move forward into implementation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

5. President Sharaa\u2019s Decree 13 on Kurdish rights is moving forward. <\/strong>On January 16, President Sharaa issued an executive decree providing rights to Syria\u2019s Kurdish minority that are second only to those guaranteed in Iraq<\/a>. This included declaring Kurdish a national language, to be taught in public and private schools in Kurdish-majority areas; granting full citizenship to all Syrian Kurds; declaring Nowruz, celebrated by Kurds, a national holiday; and making illegal any discriminatory language in media. All these measures are unprecedented in Syria\u2019s history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since the decree\u2019s public announcement and signing less than two weeks ago, the Ministry of Interior has ordered<\/a> relevant government bodies to issue citizenship to all Kurdish residents of Syria by February 5; the Ministry of Education (whose head, Mohammed Turko, is Kurdish himself) has ordered<\/a> work to begin on drafting Kurdish curricula in time for the start of the 2026-27 school year; and Nowruz will be celebrated as a public holiday in two months\u2019 time. All things considered, the rapid rate at which words are being turned into actions should help build more confidence and trust within the SDF about government intentions. Nevertheless, according to mediators involved, the SDF has conveyed reservations about the Kurdish language legislation, which is likely to evolve should integration negotiations continue constructively.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

6. Kurdish districts of Aleppo City stabilized quickly, following recent conflict. <\/strong>Hostilities in the Kurdish-majority Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud districts of Aleppo City lasted through January 6-10. Since government forces assumed full control two weeks ago, approximately 90% of the 148,000<\/a> people who had been displaced have returned. Teams from the ministries of energy, health, transport, public works and housing, social affairs, and communications and information technology have all being permanently deployed into both districts to work on repairs and rehabilitating decrepit infrastructure. Even in Raqqa City, residents received 24 hours of electricity<\/a> supply on January 20 \u2014 two days after the government took control \u2014 for the first time in over a decade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The rapid pace of government-directed stabilization and recovery work contrasts sharply with previous bouts of internal conflict elsewhere in Syria in 2025, where little was done to support communities in recovering for some time. Given the significant decline in international donor funding to aid programming in Syria, the willingness and capacity of government entities to fill the needs gap and support recovery efforts will be vital if and when conflict is resolved in Syria\u2019s northeast. Doing so will also contribute toward building trust with local communities who remain deeply skeptical of government intentions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An ongoing challenge to efforts to stabilize areas newly under government control has been unexploded ordnance (UXO) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) left behind by the SDF. For example, in one small rural pocket around the Qara Qozak Bridge in eastern Aleppo, more than 170 IEDs and landmines have been discovered and defused in the past week, according to a senior official in the Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Response. A civilian was killed<\/a> on January 27, when a booby-trap IED set up by SDF fighters inside his home detonated upon his return from displacement near the Tishreen Dam. In Aleppo City, al-Tabqa, Raqqa, and multiple other urban areas, government forces have found and defused car and motorbike bombs left behind by SDF fighters. This will prove to be a major recovery challenge requiring more time that may impede the return of displaced people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

7. Syria\u2019s government is now in control of almost all oil and gas resources. <\/strong>After 10 days of hostilities, the SDF has lost control of 10 of the 13 large-scale oil and gas facilities that had been under its control for as much as the past decade. Economically, this represents a major blow to the sustainability of the SDF\u2019s governance project, which was overwhelmingly reliant on the revenues generated by the extraction and sale of oil on the black market, with recent studies concluding that 77%<\/a> of SDF revenues and budgetary capacity came from oil sales. Without these facilities, it is impossible to envision the SDF remaining a viable entity without an external patron stepping in to replace the lost revenue<\/a>, which could amount to as much as $1 billion per year<\/a>. More than losing territory or populations alone, it was these assets that represented the SDF\u2019s existential lifeline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In terms of pre-conflict production capacity, Damascus now administers fields capable of producing<\/a> at least 300,000 barrels of oil per day \u2014 10 times what it controlled two weeks prior. On January 25, the Syrian Petroleum Company (SPC) delivered its first direct shipment<\/a> of oil to the Baniyas refinery on the Mediterranean coast. The oil originated from the al-Ward and al-Omar fields, which government forces had captured just seven days earlier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Syria\u2019s oil and gas facilities have suffered significantly from conflict damage, malpractice, and disrepair after nearly 15 years of war. The SPC has begun implementing plans aimed at reaching a total production rate of 100,000 barrels per day by May 2026. This will ease domestic fuel pressures, generate valuable revenue, and stimulate sources of employment in the rural areas where Syria\u2019s oil and gas facilities are located.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Syria will remain heavily dependent on external sources of natural gas for electricity generation, however. A bilateral deal was signed with Azerbaijan<\/a> in July 2025 for 1.2 billion cubic meters of gas per year, and a new deal with Jordan was signed this week<\/a> for an additional 1.4 billion cubic meters per year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

8. The tribal dynamic represents a significant challenge for Damascus going forward. <\/strong>Syrian government outreach in late 2025 to tribes based in eastern Syria was clearly successful in securing their mass defection away from the SDF, thereby taking approximately 80% of SDF territory in the space of 24 hours a week ago. However, the militarized nature of the tribes and their status outside any government chain of command makes them a complicated factor going forward. When conflict erupted in the Druze-majority governorate of Suwayda in July 2025, the oppression of Bedouin tribal communities by Druze militiamen triggered a nationwide tribal mobilization that wreaked havoc and resulted in days of mass killings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to a senior figure within Syria\u2019s interior ministry, significant efforts were expended following Suwayda\u2019s violence to establish better institutional connectivity with tribes across the country, in an attempt to create more sources of control over their actions. However, as precedents like Suwayda have demonstrated, when tribal interests are perceived to be under threat, violence can follow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fate of Arab villages proximate to areas of continued Kurdish control (such as the countryside southwest of Kobani) presents one potential flashpoint, but the issue of Arab detainees in SDF prisons is arguably far more flammable. In the 10 months since SDF leader Mazloum Abdi signed the March 10, 2025, framework agreement in Damascus, the group\u2019s forces have detained more than 900 Arab men<\/a> in areas under their control on charges of expressing support for the government \u2014 most<\/a> for posts on Facebook, having photos of President Sharaa on one\u2019s cell phone, or even \u201cliking\u201d social media posts supportive of Damascus. The whereabouts of a majority of these men remains unknown.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whether negotiations manage to translate into a peaceful integration of the SDF or not, the fate of these prisoners is an issue that requires urgent attention. According to one senior Syrian government official involved in negotiations with the SDF, tribal leaders are pressuring Damascus to urgently locate and release their men. So long as that fails to occur, the impetus for taking matters into their own hands will not just persist, it will grow. When 126 minors<\/a> \u2014 aged 10-18 \u2014 were discovered in al-Aqtan Prison on January 22, it prompted outcry and at least one tribe to launch a unilateral offensive into Hasakeh.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

9. US Syria policy priorities remain in Damascus, but the relationship will evolve. <\/strong>Although some within the US Congress have protested against recent SDF losses in northeastern Syria, the stance of the US government has remained consistent in prioritizing the stability, unity, and security of Syria\u2019s transitional government. US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack and US Central Command commander Admiral Bradley Cooper have spearheaded efforts to secure and sustain cease-fires and encourage the SDF\u2019s integration into the state. The objective was always to achieve integration peacefully, to ensure the SDF\u2019s achievements contribute toward strengthening Syria\u2019s transition in terms of experience, professionalism and reputation. That remains the goal, but to guarantee it is accomplished, some adaptations have been required.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One was to adopt a more assertive stance toward Abdi in recent days, to force progress on integration. Another was to take the unprecedented step of evacuating thousands of non-Syrian ISIS male detainees to neighboring Iraq, where most will face prosecution and some potential repatriation to their countries of origin. Whether the SDF willingly integrates into the state or full-scale hostilities erupt again, Syria\u2019s government appears to be on a path toward consolidating control of northeastern Syria. Assuming that eventually occurs, the need and justification for a permanent US military presence in this corner of the country will diminish (though remaining on the ground as guarantors of integration remains vital). There are active discussions underway<\/a> regarding a potential US military withdrawal, following a drawdown and repositioning earlier in 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, as that northeastern military presence looks set to evolve or even end altogether, a senior government official in Damascus has confirmed to this author that US and Syrian personnel have continued working this week to identify locations in the Damascus region for new US basing for military and intelligence personnel. That would facilitate a more secure and efficient mechanism for the ongoing bilateral US-Syrian security relationship that has focused squarely on countering ISIS and remnants of Iran\u2019s presence in Syria since the spring of 2025. In addition, the US State Department is now actively looking to establish a diplomatic presence in Damascus, while the Syrian foreign ministry expects to dispatch senior figure Mohammed Qanatri to Washington within one to two months to take on the role of charg\u00e9 d\u2019affaires.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

10. Syria\u2019s government is better placed to deal a strategic defeat to ISIS. <\/strong>While the overarching US priority in Syria remains a peaceful unification of the country and stabilization of the transition, another core driver of interest remains the ongoing campaign to defeat ISIS. Through that counterterrorism lens, the US government has consistently calculated that a unified post-Assad central government offers a far greater capacity to achieve a defeat of ISIS than any non-state actor, including the SDF.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Data would appear to justify that assessment, as ISIS attacks declined by 50%<\/a> in the year following Assad\u2019s fall \u2014 from 692 attacks in 2024 to 348 attacks in 2025. Moreover, 90% of ISIS\u2019s attacks in 2025 took place in SDF-held areas, where the terror group clearly saw the acute tensions fueled by the SDF\u2019s rule over wide swathes of Arab territory as an opening to exploit. After years of the Assad regime failing to combat ISIS throughout Syria\u2019s central desert, Syrian government forces \u2014 and US aircraft \u2014 were quick to step in, and increasingly close US-Syrian intelligence sharing resulted in at least 11 mass casualty ISIS plots being foiled in 2025 and three senior ISIS leaders being killed, including the group\u2019s overall commander for all of Syria. As a result, the potency of ISIS attacks also plunged<\/a> in 2025 \u2014756 deaths attributed to the group were recorded in 2024 and 183 in 2025, marking a 76% decline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These are extremely encouraging signs. However, for them to be sustained and enhanced further, the SDF\u2019s integration into the state must be accomplished, and peacefully. Then, the challenge will turn increasingly to tackling an ISIS whose own adaptation under pressure has been to invest in urban operations. Rather than US airstrikes, the onus will need to be placed on Syrian ground forces, intelligence networks, and local law enforcement. Tackling that far more complex challenge will be immeasurably harder should Syria\u2019s government also face a Kurdish militant insurgency resulting from failed integration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What the US should do<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Amid an extremely complex and rapidly evolving situation, the United States remains the<\/em> integral actor upon which negotiations and a peaceful solution most depends. With US troops on the ground and diplomats in the immediate region and ferrying in and out of Damascus, the priority must be to continue mediation. While areas of disagreement remain, readouts shared with this author from recent talks indicate both sides have adopted a constructive attitude to finding compromise and a path forward. This is good and very encouraging, but it would be unlikely were US officials not at the table. Both the Syrian government and the SDF need Washington on-side, which provides sufficient leverage to pressure for compromise, progress, and implementation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While Damascus seeks substantive progress on the big files of military, security, and governance integration, recent hostilities and heightened emotions require more tactical confidence-building measures. The government\u2019s quick steps to implement the core facets of Decree 13, granting full national rights to Kurds, is a positive step. President Sharaa should make clear publicly that these steps will be guaranteed in a reformed constitution. In turn, the US should convey to Damascus the need for compromise on integrated SDF fighters remaining within division-like formations in the northeast \u2014 at least for an interim period \u2014 even if the legal process of integration is undertaken on an individual basis. It is unrealistic to expect the SDF to comply otherwise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Militarily, US troops on the ground should consider initiating joint patrols \u2014 both with government and SDF forces. Each side retains a direct relationship with the US, and each would benefit from being seen to continue coordinating with US partners. Activating joint patrols would also insert a third-party dynamic on the ground that could sharply discourage cease-fire violations and other escalatory steps.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the diplomatic sphere, the US should look to coordinate more multilaterally with regional governments directly or indirectly involved with northeastern Syria and Syria\u2019s transition. From Turkey and Iraq, to Jordan and the Gulf, all have been involved in back channels, mediation and bilateral engagements in recent weeks, but on an individual basis. All seek a peaceful solution in the Syrian northeast, and all have their own sources of influence and leverage to bear. Attempting to unite a regional collective effort to achieve a peaceful integration of the SDF in Syria would appear more potentially effective than the individual approach pursued to date, which has allowed Damascus and the SDF to pick and choose whom to listen to and whom to ignore.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Charles Lister is Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute and heads MEI\u2019s Syria Initiative.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Photo by Omar Haj Kadour \/ AFP via Getty Image<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Taken from the Middle East Institute (MEI)<\/a> is an independent, non-partisan, not-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars\u2019 opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors\u2019 views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

While Damascus seeks substantive progress on the big files of military, security, and governance integration, recent hostilities and heightened emotions require more tactical confidence-building measures. The government\u2019s quick steps to implement the core facets of Decree 13, granting full national rights to Kurds, is a positive step. President Sharaa should make clear publicly that these steps will be guaranteed in a reformed constitution. In turn, the US should convey to Damascus the need for compromise on integrated SDF fighters remaining within division-like formations in the northeast \u2014 at least for an interim period \u2014 even if the legal process of integration is undertaken on an individual basis. 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Ten key points to consider - The Institute For MENA Stability<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/menastability.org\/en\/middle-east\/integration-or-conflict-in-northeastern-syria-ten-key-points-to-consider\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Integration or conflict in northeastern Syria? Ten key points to consider - The Institute For MENA Stability\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"While Damascus seeks substantive progress on the big files of military, security, and governance integration, recent hostilities and heightened emotions require more tactical confidence-building measures. The government\u2019s quick steps to implement the core facets of Decree 13, granting full national rights to Kurds, is a positive step. President Sharaa should make clear publicly that these steps will be guaranteed in a reformed constitution. In turn, the US should convey to Damascus the need for compromise on integrated SDF fighters remaining within division-like formations in the northeast \u2014 at least for an interim period \u2014 even if the legal process of integration is undertaken on an individual basis. 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