{"id":102,"date":"2026-02-24T13:13:15","date_gmt":"2026-02-24T13:13:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/?p=102"},"modified":"2026-02-26T13:20:53","modified_gmt":"2026-02-26T13:20:53","slug":"energising-syrias-future","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/en\/institute-for-mena-stability\/energising-syrias-future\/","title":{"rendered":"Energising Syria’s future"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Syria has many challenges. Energy is one. The EU can be part of the solution with a strong offer supporting domestic electricity generation and long-term energy system integration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Syria\u2019s energy system is in ruins. To rebuild energy security the country\u2019s new government faces two major challenges. The first, vital for Syria\u2019s swift recovery and political stability, is bringing reliable flows of electricity and fuel to its people. The second is defining the role of Syria\u2019s own natural resources \u2013 including oil and gas reserves, renewables potential and its strategic location as a transit hub \u2013 in shaping its future. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU needs to balance strong support for Syria\u2019s reconstruction with awareness of the new geopolitical dynamics of energy in the post-Assad era. In the short to medium term, it should support energy generation in Syria, especially in renewable electricity. In the longer term, it should offer Syria a role in an interconnected Eastern Mediterranean energy hub with independent access to the EU market for gas and electricity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The state of play <\/p>\n\n\n\n

For more than a decade, Syrians have been coping with severe energy shortages. Years of war and division have crippled over 50% of the country’s electricity grid<\/a>. The war has seen a drop in electricity generation capacity from 8 500 Megawatts to just 3 500<\/a>, primarily due to the destruction of key power plants including Mahardah, Aleppo and Zayzoun<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The lack of reliable energy supplies is a major concern for Syrian citizens and its new government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Syria\u2019s oil and gas sector is in an even worse state. Before 2011 the country was an oil exporter producing 400 000 barrels of oil per day. Today, it scarcely produces 20 000<\/a> and relies on imports. Its gas sector, nascent in 2011, is almost none-existent today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The lack of reliable energy supplies is a major concern for Syrian citizens and its new government, making it a key point of leverage. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Qatar and T\u00fcrkiye have stepped in to provide short-term assistance. The two states have provided two floating power stations<\/a>, while T\u00fcrkiye is also connecting its grid to Syria<\/a>. Such efforts help with Syria\u2019s post-conflict recovery but should also be seen in a broader geopolitical context.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Data: European Commission, GISCO, 2025; GEM, 2024; PRIO, PETRODATA, 2009<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Geopolitics of energy in Syria<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye fostered regional power hub ambitions even before the fall of the Assad regime. Its current pipelines provide oil and gas from Russia and Azerbaijan to the EU<\/a>. Ankara aims to challenge the Eastern Mediterranean gas forum by positioning itself as the key conduit for gas flowing from Egypt, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and possibly Syria<\/a> and Iraq<\/a> into Europe. It also has ambitions to expand its own oil and gas production in the Black Sea and in contested waters off Syria\u2019s coast around Cyprus. It has already sought to accelerate negotiations demarcating sea borders<\/a> with the new Syrian government. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye has supported the regional electricity grid of Idlib<\/a> since 2021 in parallel with its backing of the Idlib-based rebels who now control Syria. The provision of a reliable supply of Turkish electricity has helped bolster the legitimacy of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in the breakaway region. A similar formula of Turkish-provided energy security hopes to replicate this success at the national level.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye fostered regional power hub ambitions even before the fall of the Assad regime. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Qatar too is aligned with T\u00fcrkiye in supporting the new regime. Its longstanding support for the Idlib rebels gives it a vested interest in ensuring their survival in Damascus. Alongside geopolitical gain, it is also well-placed to profit from helping develop Syria\u2019s oil and fossil gas reserves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cognisant that energy is a key vulnerability for the new government, Saudi Arabia has cautiously provided support, although this has been limited to short-term fuel supplies. More concerning for the EU, Russia and Iran appear ready to exploit energy vulnerabilities to leverage some of their former relationships in Syria. Iran has signalled that it is willing to drop demands for the $30-50 billion<\/a> owed to it by the previous regime for oil imports, seemingly as part of negotiations on restoring diplomatic relations<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU and Syrian energy security <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU should not be a passive actor in the energy politics playing out in Syria and the broader Eastern Mediterranean. On Syria it should put forward two clear proposals: one to complement initiatives by T\u00fcrkiye and Qatar, and another to freeze out those of Russia and Iran. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first is short to medium-term support for Syria\u2019s energy sector, which urgently needs investment. Prior to the war, European-based oil companies, Total and Shell<\/a>, had considerable interests in Syria which could be restored. Syria\u2019s proximity to the EU makes it a strong candidate for near-shoring and diversifying energy supplies. The EU should therefore take a more assertive role in supporting Syria\u2019s renewable energy sector, especially solar, which has undergone considerable expansion despite the war. The country has significant potential for renewable energy, lying within the solar belt with high levels of solar radiation<\/a> and featuring several areas where  wind speeds exceed 6 m\/s<\/a>, making wind power a viable option. The civil war demonstrated to the Syrian people that energy independence with local control over energy supplies<\/a> is one of the few ways to guarantee energy security. The EU should build on this strong foundation to help with the country\u2019s recovery while advancing its own strategic interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU should not be a passive actor in the energy politics playing out in Syria and the broader Eastern Mediterranean.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second proposal envisions a longer-term energy system integration plan for Syria, independent of initiatives led by T\u00fcrkiye, Qatar and other actors. The EU could facilitate Syria\u2019s integration into the European energy market by establishing interconnections via Cyprus and Greece for both electricity and gas. This would link Syria to an alternative gas grid while also granting access to a large import and export market for electricity. While this requires time and considerable investment, it would connect to a broader strategy integrating the EU into the Eastern Mediterranean. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

By offering robust economic support and promoting regional energy security, the EU can play a meaningful role in shaping Syria\u2019s future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Taken from the European Union Institute for Security Studies<\/a>, written by Caspar Hobhouse<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Data: European Commission, GISCO, 2025; GEM, 2024; PRIO, PETRODATA, 2009
\nGeopolitics of energy in Syria
\nT\u00fcrkiye fostered regional power hub ambitions even before the fall of the Assad regime. Its current pipelines provide oil and gas from\u00a0Russia and Azerbaijan to the EU. Ankara aims to challenge the Eastern Mediterranean gas forum by positioning itself as the key conduit for gas flowing from Egypt, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and possibly\u00a0Syria\u00a0and\u00a0Iraq\u00a0into Europe. It also has ambitions to expand its own oil and gas production in the Black Sea and in contested waters off Syria\u2019s coast around Cyprus. It has already sought to accelerate negotiations\u00a0demarcating sea borders\u00a0with the new Syrian government.\u00a0
\nT\u00fcrkiye has supported the\u00a0regional electricity grid of Idlib\u00a0since 2021 in parallel with its backing of the Idlib-based rebels who now control Syria. The provision of a reliable supply of Turkish electricity has helped bolster the legitimacy of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in the breakaway region. A similar formula of Turkish-provided energy security hopes to replicate this success at the national level.
\nT\u00fcrkiye fostered regional power hub ambitions even before the fall of the Assad regime.\u00a0
\nQatar too is aligned with T\u00fcrkiye in supporting the new regime. Its longstanding support for the Idlib rebels gives it a vested interest in ensuring their survival in Damascus. Alongside geopolitical gain, it is also well-placed to profit from helping develop Syria\u2019s oil and fossil gas reserves.
\nCognisant that energy is a key vulnerability for the new government, Saudi Arabia has cautiously provided support, although this has been limited to short-term fuel supplies. More concerning for the EU, Russia and Iran appear ready to exploit energy vulnerabilities to leverage some of their former relationships in Syria. Iran has signalled\u00a0that it is willing to drop demands for the $30-50 billion\u00a0owed to it by the previous regime for oil imports, seemingly as part of\u00a0negotiations on restoring diplomatic relations.\u00a0
\nThe EU and Syrian energy security\u00a0
\nThe EU should not be a passive actor in the energy politics playing out in Syria and the broader Eastern Mediterranean. On Syria it should put forward two clear proposals: one to complement initiatives by T\u00fcrkiye and Qatar, and another to freeze out those of Russia and Iran.\u00a0
\nThe first is short to medium-term support for Syria\u2019s energy sector, which urgently needs investment. Prior to the war, European-based oil companies,\u00a0Total and Shell, had considerable interests in Syria which could be restored. Syria\u2019s proximity to the EU makes it a strong candidate for near-shoring and diversifying energy supplies. The EU should therefore take a more assertive role in supporting Syria\u2019s renewable energy sector, especially solar, which has undergone considerable expansion despite the war. The country has significant potential for renewable energy, lying within the\u00a0solar belt with high levels of solar radiation\u00a0and featuring several areas where \u00a0wind speeds exceed 6 m\/s, making wind power a viable option. The\u00a0civil war demonstrated to the Syrian people that\u00a0energy independence with local control over energy supplies\u00a0is one of the few ways to guarantee energy security. The EU should build on this strong foundation to help with the country\u2019s recovery while advancing its own strategic interests.
\nThe EU should not be a passive actor in the energy politics playing out in Syria and the broader Eastern Mediterranean.
\nThe second proposal envisions a longer-term energy system integration plan for Syria, independent of initiatives led by T\u00fcrkiye, Qatar and other actors. The EU could facilitate Syria\u2019s integration into the European energy market by establishing interconnections via Cyprus and Greece for both electricity and gas. This would link Syria to an alternative gas grid while also granting access to a large import and export market for electricity. While this requires time and considerable investment, it would connect to a broader strategy integrating the EU into the Eastern Mediterranean.\u00a0
\nBy offering robust economic support and promoting regional energy security, the EU can play a meaningful role in shaping Syria\u2019s future.
\nTaken from the European Union Institute for Security Studies, written by Caspar Hobhouse<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":103,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[12,5],"tags":[98,103,99,97,101,20,19,11,7,6,100,102],"class_list":["post-102","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-institute-for-mena-stability","category-syria","tag-eu","tag-eu-and-syria","tag-eu-syria","tag-european-union","tag-geopolitics-of-energy-in-syria","tag-institute-for-mena-stability","tag-mena","tag-mena-stability","tag-middle-east","tag-syria","tag-syria-energy-crisis","tag-turkiye-supporting-syria"],"yoast_head":"\nEnergising Syria's future - The Institute For MENA Stability<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/menastability.org\/en\/institute-for-mena-stability\/energising-syrias-future\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Energising Syria's future - The Institute For MENA Stability\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Data: European Commission, GISCO, 2025; GEM, 2024; PRIO, PETRODATA, 2009 Geopolitics of energy in Syria T\u00fcrkiye fostered regional power hub ambitions even before the fall of the Assad regime. Its current pipelines provide oil and gas from\u00a0Russia and Azerbaijan to the EU. Ankara aims to challenge the Eastern Mediterranean gas forum by positioning itself as the key conduit for gas flowing from Egypt, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and possibly\u00a0Syria\u00a0and\u00a0Iraq\u00a0into Europe. It also has ambitions to expand its own oil and gas production in the Black Sea and in contested waters off Syria\u2019s coast around Cyprus. It has already sought to accelerate negotiations\u00a0demarcating sea borders\u00a0with the new Syrian government.\u00a0 T\u00fcrkiye has supported the\u00a0regional electricity grid of Idlib\u00a0since 2021 in parallel with its backing of the Idlib-based rebels who now control Syria. The provision of a reliable supply of Turkish electricity has helped bolster the legitimacy of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in the breakaway region. A similar formula of Turkish-provided energy security hopes to replicate this success at the national level. T\u00fcrkiye fostered regional power hub ambitions even before the fall of the Assad regime.\u00a0 Qatar too is aligned with T\u00fcrkiye in supporting the new regime. Its longstanding support for the Idlib rebels gives it a vested interest in ensuring their survival in Damascus. Alongside geopolitical gain, it is also well-placed to profit from helping develop Syria\u2019s oil and fossil gas reserves. Cognisant that energy is a key vulnerability for the new government, Saudi Arabia has cautiously provided support, although this has been limited to short-term fuel supplies. More concerning for the EU, Russia and Iran appear ready to exploit energy vulnerabilities to leverage some of their former relationships in Syria. Iran has signalled\u00a0that it is willing to drop demands for the $30-50 billion\u00a0owed to it by the previous regime for oil imports, seemingly as part of\u00a0negotiations on restoring diplomatic relations.\u00a0 The EU and Syrian energy security\u00a0 The EU should not be a passive actor in the energy politics playing out in Syria and the broader Eastern Mediterranean. On Syria it should put forward two clear proposals: one to complement initiatives by T\u00fcrkiye and Qatar, and another to freeze out those of Russia and Iran.\u00a0 The first is short to medium-term support for Syria\u2019s energy sector, which urgently needs investment. Prior to the war, European-based oil companies,\u00a0Total and Shell, had considerable interests in Syria which could be restored. Syria\u2019s proximity to the EU makes it a strong candidate for near-shoring and diversifying energy supplies. The EU should therefore take a more assertive role in supporting Syria\u2019s renewable energy sector, especially solar, which has undergone considerable expansion despite the war. The country has significant potential for renewable energy, lying within the\u00a0solar belt with high levels of solar radiation\u00a0and featuring several areas where \u00a0wind speeds exceed 6 m\/s, making wind power a viable option. The\u00a0civil war demonstrated to the Syrian people that\u00a0energy independence with local control over energy supplies\u00a0is one of the few ways to guarantee energy security. The EU should build on this strong foundation to help with the country\u2019s recovery while advancing its own strategic interests. The EU should not be a passive actor in the energy politics playing out in Syria and the broader Eastern Mediterranean. The second proposal envisions a longer-term energy system integration plan for Syria, independent of initiatives led by T\u00fcrkiye, Qatar and other actors. The EU could facilitate Syria\u2019s integration into the European energy market by establishing interconnections via Cyprus and Greece for both electricity and gas. This would link Syria to an alternative gas grid while also granting access to a large import and export market for electricity. While this requires time and considerable investment, it would connect to a broader strategy integrating the EU into the Eastern Mediterranean.\u00a0 By offering robust economic support and promoting regional energy security, the EU can play a meaningful role in shaping Syria\u2019s future. 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Its current pipelines provide oil and gas from\u00a0Russia and Azerbaijan to the EU. Ankara aims to challenge the Eastern Mediterranean gas forum by positioning itself as the key conduit for gas flowing from Egypt, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and possibly\u00a0Syria\u00a0and\u00a0Iraq\u00a0into Europe. It also has ambitions to expand its own oil and gas production in the Black Sea and in contested waters off Syria\u2019s coast around Cyprus. It has already sought to accelerate negotiations\u00a0demarcating sea borders\u00a0with the new Syrian government.\u00a0 T\u00fcrkiye has supported the\u00a0regional electricity grid of Idlib\u00a0since 2021 in parallel with its backing of the Idlib-based rebels who now control Syria. The provision of a reliable supply of Turkish electricity has helped bolster the legitimacy of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in the breakaway region. A similar formula of Turkish-provided energy security hopes to replicate this success at the national level. T\u00fcrkiye fostered regional power hub ambitions even before the fall of the Assad regime.\u00a0 Qatar too is aligned with T\u00fcrkiye in supporting the new regime. Its longstanding support for the Idlib rebels gives it a vested interest in ensuring their survival in Damascus. Alongside geopolitical gain, it is also well-placed to profit from helping develop Syria\u2019s oil and fossil gas reserves. Cognisant that energy is a key vulnerability for the new government, Saudi Arabia has cautiously provided support, although this has been limited to short-term fuel supplies. More concerning for the EU, Russia and Iran appear ready to exploit energy vulnerabilities to leverage some of their former relationships in Syria. Iran has signalled\u00a0that it is willing to drop demands for the $30-50 billion\u00a0owed to it by the previous regime for oil imports, seemingly as part of\u00a0negotiations on restoring diplomatic relations.\u00a0 The EU and Syrian energy security\u00a0 The EU should not be a passive actor in the energy politics playing out in Syria and the broader Eastern Mediterranean. On Syria it should put forward two clear proposals: one to complement initiatives by T\u00fcrkiye and Qatar, and another to freeze out those of Russia and Iran.\u00a0 The first is short to medium-term support for Syria\u2019s energy sector, which urgently needs investment. Prior to the war, European-based oil companies,\u00a0Total and Shell, had considerable interests in Syria which could be restored. Syria\u2019s proximity to the EU makes it a strong candidate for near-shoring and diversifying energy supplies. The EU should therefore take a more assertive role in supporting Syria\u2019s renewable energy sector, especially solar, which has undergone considerable expansion despite the war. The country has significant potential for renewable energy, lying within the\u00a0solar belt with high levels of solar radiation\u00a0and featuring several areas where \u00a0wind speeds exceed 6 m\/s, making wind power a viable option. The\u00a0civil war demonstrated to the Syrian people that\u00a0energy independence with local control over energy supplies\u00a0is one of the few ways to guarantee energy security. The EU should build on this strong foundation to help with the country\u2019s recovery while advancing its own strategic interests. The EU should not be a passive actor in the energy politics playing out in Syria and the broader Eastern Mediterranean. The second proposal envisions a longer-term energy system integration plan for Syria, independent of initiatives led by T\u00fcrkiye, Qatar and other actors. The EU could facilitate Syria\u2019s integration into the European energy market by establishing interconnections via Cyprus and Greece for both electricity and gas. This would link Syria to an alternative gas grid while also granting access to a large import and export market for electricity. While this requires time and considerable investment, it would connect to a broader strategy integrating the EU into the Eastern Mediterranean.\u00a0 By offering robust economic support and promoting regional energy security, the EU can play a meaningful role in shaping Syria\u2019s future. Taken from the European Union Institute for Security Studies, written by Caspar Hobhouse","og_url":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/en\/institute-for-mena-stability\/energising-syrias-future\/","og_site_name":"The Institute For MENA Stability","article_published_time":"2026-02-24T13:13:15+00:00","article_modified_time":"2026-02-26T13:20:53+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1920,"height":640,"url":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-17.png","type":"image\/png"}],"author":"The Institute For MENA Stability","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@Stability4Mena","twitter_site":"@Stability4Mena","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"The Institute For MENA Stability","Est. reading time":"5 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/institute-for-mena-stability\/energising-syrias-future\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/institute-for-mena-stability\/energising-syrias-future\/"},"author":{"name":"The Institute For MENA Stability","@id":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/#\/schema\/person\/ad3bfd35a68be598bb0a0e66430ed61f"},"headline":"Energising Syria’s future","datePublished":"2026-02-24T13:13:15+00:00","dateModified":"2026-02-26T13:20:53+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/institute-for-mena-stability\/energising-syrias-future\/"},"wordCount":1086,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/institute-for-mena-stability\/energising-syrias-future\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-17.png","keywords":["EU","EU and Syria","Eu Syria","European Union","Geopolitics of energy in Syria","Institute for MENA Stability","MENA","MENA Stability","Middle East","Syria","Syria Energy Crisis","T\u00fcrkiye Supporting Syria"],"articleSection":["Institute for MENA Stability","Syria"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/menastability.org\/institute-for-mena-stability\/energising-syrias-future\/#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/institute-for-mena-stability\/energising-syrias-future\/","url":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/institute-for-mena-stability\/energising-syrias-future\/","name":"Energising Syria's future - 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