{"id":23,"date":"2026-01-15T13:53:01","date_gmt":"2026-01-15T13:53:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/?p=23"},"modified":"2026-02-03T14:35:13","modified_gmt":"2026-02-03T14:35:13","slug":"ankaras-double-win-kurds-israel-and-the-new-syria","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/menastability.org\/en\/institute-for-mena-stability\/ankaras-double-win-kurds-israel-and-the-new-syria\/","title":{"rendered":"Ankara\u2019s double win: Kurds, Israel, and the new Syria"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

After a year of talks mediated by the United States failed to persuade the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) \u2014 a Kurdish-led militia that controls autonomous civilian and military institutions in Syria\u2019s northeast \u2014 to dismantle those structures and integrate into the Syrian state, long-simmering tensions with Damascus boiled over<\/a>, leading to a rapid shift in dynamics on the ground. Over the past two weeks, government forces have seized<\/a> large swathes of northern and eastern Syria from the SDF, retaking two key Arab-majority provinces, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. The offensive brought<\/a> major oil fields, hydroelectric dams, and detention facilities holding Islamic State (ISIS) fighters and affiliated civilians back under state control, significantly consolidating President Ahmed al-Sharaa\u2019s authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A four-day cease-fire between the Syrian government and the SDF agreed<\/a> on January 20 has been extended<\/a> by 15 days, giving the group time to disarm and present a plan for integration into the Syrian army \u2014 or to resume fighting. Whether the truce holds or collapses will have major implications for neighboring Turkey, which has long-standing interests in Syria, but recent developments already point to a win for Ankara. From Turkey\u2019s perspective, post-Bashar al-Assad Syria presented two immediate challenges: Kurdish autonomy along its southern border and Israeli actions that Ankara believed undermined its goals. The latest shifts suggest that Tom Barrack, President Donald Trump\u2019s ambassador to Ankara and special envoy for Syria, helped tilt the balance in Turkey\u2019s favor on both fronts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey\u2019s twin problems in post-Assad Syria<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since its creation in 2015, the US-backed SDF has been viewed<\/a> by Ankara as a national security threat. The dominance of groups linked to the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party (PKK), which Ankara views as a terrorist organization, within the SDF prompted Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan to accuse the US, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally, of arming Turkey\u2019s archenemy. US-SDF cooperation strained Ankara\u2019s relations with Washington, fueled<\/a> anti-American sentiment in Turkey, and intensified<\/a> nationalist fears in the country that the Kurds were building a state on its border with US support. Erdo\u011fan leveraged this dynamic \u2014 along with the emergence of Kurdish self-rule in Syria \u2014 to pursue<\/a> a hardline anti-Kurdish agenda and forge an alliance with the nationalist Milliyet\u00e7i Hareket Partisi <\/em>(Nationalist Movement Party, MHP), a partnership that enabled<\/a> his long-sought shift to an all-powerful executive presidency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Today, the fate of the SDF and Kurdish autonomy are once again tightly bound to Erdo\u011fan\u2019s domestic calculus. He has launched<\/a> a new initiative involving the imprisoned PKK leader, Abdullah \u00d6calan, aimed at dismantling the organization following its announcement<\/a> last May that it would disarm. The initiative is driven<\/a> primarily by the need to secure pro-Kurdish parliamentary backing to allow him to run for president again in 2028, despite constitutional limits. The success of that effort hinges<\/a> on the dissolution of the SDF and the unraveling of Kurdish autonomy in Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ankara also saw Israel\u2019s expanded military footprint<\/a> in Syria after Assad\u2019s fall as an obstacle to achieving its objectives. Beyond concerns that Israeli operations were further destabilizing the country, Turkish officials worried that the continued presence of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would reduce pressure on Syrian Kurds to compromise with Damascus. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan repeatedly suggested<\/a> that the SDF was stalling on implementing the agreement reached on March 10, 2025, to integrate its forces into the Syrian national army, believing Israel would back them \u2014 much as the Israeli government has supported the Druze<\/a> in southern Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, Turkey moved to expand<\/a> its own military footprint in post-Assad Syria, including exploring a joint defense arrangement that could enable the establishment of new Turkish bases in the center of the country and the deployment of radar systems on its territory. Israeli officials strongly opposed<\/a> the radar plan, arguing it would sharply constrain Israel\u2019s freedom of movement in Syrian airspace and potentially hinder its ability to conduct operations beyond the country, including against targets in Iran. Last April, Ankara reportedly<\/a> evaluated at least three Syrian airbases for potential deployment, sites that Israel later targeted with airstrikes. Defense Minister Israel Katz described<\/a> those strikes as a warning that Israel would not allow its security to be compromised, while Foreign Minister Gideon Sa\u2019ar accused<\/a> Turkey of seeking to establish a \u201cTurkish protectorate\u201d in Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Problems solved?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Syrian government\u2019s recent military offensive has left the SDF in a precarious<\/a> position. Thousands of its Arab recruits have defected, accelerating the group\u2019s collapse, while it has lost large swathes of territory it controlled for nearly a decade. Its units are set to be dismantled, its fighters absorbed into the Syrian army with no Kurdish-majority formations, and the autonomous administration it built during the war against ISIS folded into the new state. Washington no longer appears to see the SDF as central to its regional strategy: US Special Envoy for Syria Barrack has said<\/a> the group\u2019s original mission has \u201clargely expired\u201d and that the Kurds\u2019 best hope now lies with President Sharaa\u2019s government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although Israel was never likely to support the SDF the way it has Syria\u2019s Druze, on whose behalf it intervened<\/a> against Damascus last summer, SDF figures the author spoke with nonetheless hoped that even the possibility of Israeli involvement might deter a military campaign by the Syrian government and Turkey-backed forces. Israel\u2019s decision<\/a> to stay on the sidelines during Damascus\u2019s recent operations has now removed that illusion, making clear to Syrian Kurds that Israel will not get involved directly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Taken together, this leaves the SDF with several grim choices. If, after the two-week cease-fire deadline expires, it opts to resume fighting, Syrian forces are likely to overrun the remaining SDF-held territory, with Kurdish civilians caught in the crossfire and little prospect of meaningful international protection. If the SDF instead accepts Damascus\u2019s terms, it will effectively be acquiescing to the end of the experiment in Kurdish autonomy in Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What does all of this mean for Ankara\u2019s effort to dismantle the PKK? After the Syrian government moved against the SDF, Kurds in Turkey took<\/a> to the streets following a call by the pro-Kurdish Peoples\u2019 Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Parti<\/em>), the country\u2019s third-largest political faction. Clashes with police ensued, prompting some DEM officials the author spoke with to declare that the \u201cpeace process\u201d with the PKK is dead. That judgment, however, is premature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The talks with PKK leader \u00d6calan have been conducted largely without meaningful input from DEM or the broader Kurdish public, and \u00d6calan is likely to stay the course so long as violence against Kurds does not spiral out of control. He long ago abandoned<\/a> demands for Kurdish statehood or territorial autonomy, instead advocating<\/a> for \u201cdemocratic local governance.\u201d After the March 10 agreement between Damascus and the SDF \u2014 meant to pave the way for the integration of SDF military and civilian structures into Syrian state institutions \u2014 \u00d6calan pressed<\/a> the SDF to implement it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The terms now being offered by Damascus are far less favorable, and President Sharaa\u2019s decree<\/a> recognizing Kurdish rights, citizenship, and language has drawn criticism from Kurdish actors who want constitutional guarantees instead. Even so, \u00d6calan\u2019s pragmatism remains central. His own interests are tied to the continuation of talks: Imprisoned on \u0130mral\u0131 Island in the Sea of Marmara since 1999, he stands to gain improved conditions and reduced isolation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recently released<\/a> minutes from November meetings between \u00d6calan and visiting delegations underscore this pragmatism. According to redacted transcripts, even as Damascus was attacking the SDF, \u00d6calan continued to push for PKK disarmament and appeared resigned to Syrian Kurds giving up autonomy in favor of integration into national institutions. At the same time, recent developments have revealed that \u00d6calan\u2019s leverage is weaker than Ankara initially assumed. Despite his pressure, the SDF delayed implementing the March 10 agreement. Two Kurdish officials told the author he now faces growing criticism from the Kurdish public, a significant portion of which had hoped the talks with Ankara would help Syrian Kurds preserve the gains they made during the war. All of this suggests one outcome is most likely: Barring a major escalation of violence against Kurds, \u00d6calan will continue to back the disarmament talks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00d6calan\u2019s continued commitment to disarmament \u2014 and the collapse of the SDF along with Kurdish autonomy \u2014 effectively resolves Erdo\u011fan\u2019s \u201cKurdish problem\u201d in Syria. On the \u201cIsrael problem,\u201d Ankara also believes its hand has been strengthened, largely thanks to Ambassador Barrack. A Turkish official told the author that Ankara coordinated with Barrack ahead of the offensive to ensure Israel would not intervene to protect the SDF. Barrack may also be tilting the balance toward Turkey on other priorities. Turkey recently deployed<\/a> an advanced radar system at Damascus International Airport \u2014 the HTRS-100 air traffic control radar produced by Turkish defense firm ASELSAN. Turkey\u2019s ambassador to Syria, Nuh Y\u0131lmaz, described it as a major infrastructure upgrade for the capital\u2019s main aviation hub. While Turkish officials insist the system is for civilian use, Israeli officials worry it could still constrain Israel\u2019s freedom of action in Syrian airspace.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The cease-fire between Damascus and the Kurds comes at a sensitive moment for Israel, as talks over a potential security arrangement with Syria have resumed<\/a>. After a two-month impasse, senior Israeli, Syrian, and US officials reconvened in Paris on January 6 and agreed<\/a> to establish a joint mechanism \u2014 a dedicated communication center to enable ongoing coordination on intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomacy, and commercial issues under US supervision. Despite this progress, major gaps remain between the two sides. President Sharaa is demanding Israel\u2019s full withdrawal from the buffer zone and the Syrian side of Mount Hermon \u2014 steps Israel sees<\/a> as especially difficult, particularly regarding Hermon. But recent developments in Syria have strengthened Sharaa\u2019s hand, and he appears to enjoy Trump\u2019s backing. Turkish officials believe that with Sharaa and Turkey gaining ground \u2014 and Washington seemingly aligned \u2014 Israel may find it harder to resist US pressure to compromise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From Ankara\u2019s perspective, once the SDF issue is settled, a division of influence in Syria \u2014 Israel in the south, Turkey in the north \u2014 is acceptable, perhaps even advantageous. If Israeli forces withdraw, scrutiny will inevitably shift to Turkey\u2019s tens of thousands of troops inside Syria. If Israel stays, Damascus may feel more exposed and therefore more inclined to deepen cooperation with Turkey. This is the dilemma Israeli decision-makers now face as they weigh their next moves in Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

G\u00f6n\u00fcl Tol is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Photo by AFP via Getty Images<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

From Ankara\u2019s perspective, once the SDF issue is settled, a division of influence in Syria \u2014 Israel in the south, Turkey in the north \u2014 is acceptable, perhaps even advantageous. If Israeli forces withdraw, scrutiny will inevitably shift to Turkey\u2019s tens of thousands of troops inside Syria. If Israel stays, Damascus may feel more exposed and therefore more inclined to deepen cooperation with Turkey. This is the dilemma Israeli decision-makers now face as they weigh their next moves in Syria.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":24,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[12,4],"tags":[23,20,15,19,11,7,17,18,6,16,22,21],"class_list":["post-23","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-institute-for-mena-stability","category-middle-east","tag-erdogan","tag-institute-for-mena-stability","tag-israel","tag-mena","tag-mena-stability","tag-middle-east","tag-sdf","tag-sdf-syria","tag-syria","tag-syrian-government","tag-turkey","tag-turkish-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan"],"yoast_head":"\nAnkara\u2019s double win: Kurds, Israel, and the new Syria - The Institute For MENA Stability<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/menastability.org\/en\/institute-for-mena-stability\/ankaras-double-win-kurds-israel-and-the-new-syria\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Ankara\u2019s double win: Kurds, Israel, and the new Syria - The Institute For MENA Stability\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"From Ankara\u2019s perspective, once the SDF issue is settled, a division of influence in Syria \u2014 Israel in the south, Turkey in the north \u2014 is acceptable, perhaps even advantageous. 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